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ABSTRACT 
I argue first that the Eurozone crisis has left a legacy of unsustainable government debt 
levels. These will continue to exert a deflationary dynamics in the Eurozone. Second, I argue 
that the institutional innovations since the start of the debt crisis fall short of what is needed 
to solve the design failures of the Eurozone. In addition, they are not sustainable, mainly 
because they have led to a situation where bureaucratic institutions have been vested with 
more responsibilities without a concomitant increase in the democratic legitimacy of these 
institutions. 
  
                                                                
1 I am grateful for the comments of an anonnymous referee that added value to this paper.  
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1. Introduction 
After years of turbulence in the Eurozone that at some point led to existential fears about 
the survival of the monetary union, peace and tranquility seem to have returned in 2014. In 
official circles the view prevails that the eurocrisis is over and that the return of tranquility is 
the result of the institutional changes that have been introduced since the start of the 
sovereign debt crisis in 2010. Prominent among these institutional changes is the setup of 
tighter discipline in fiscal policies, the monitoring of macroeconomic imbalances and the 
banking union.  
In this paper I dispute this view. I will first analyze the legacy of the sovereign debt crisis, 
arguing that this crisis has led to unsustainable debt levels that will continue to haunt the 
Eurozone. Second, I will argue that the ill-designed of fiscal policies is at the core of the 
continuing low growth performance of the Eurozone. Third, I will argue that although there 
has been some progress towards institutional reform, this falls short of what is needed to 
deal with the design failures of the Eurozone. 
2. New governance of Eurozone: Creditor nations rule supreme 
There can be little doubt that the ECB saved the Eurozone, at least for the time being when 
in 2012 it announced its OMT program. The latter is a commitment to provide unlimited 
amounts of liquidity in the sovereign bond markets of the Eurozone in times of crisis. The 
ECB’s announcement, however, did not prevent the Eurozone from developing into a 
governance in which the creditor countries dictate the budgetary and macroeconomic 
policies for the Eurozone as a whole.  
The Southern European countries (including Ireland) are the countries that have 
accumulated current account deficits in the past, while the Northern Eurozone countries2 
have built up current account surpluses. As a result, the Southern countries have become 
the debtors and the Northern countries the creditors in the system (see Figure 1)3. This has 
forced the Southern countries hit by sudden liquidity stops to beg the Northern ones for 
financial support. The latter have reluctantly done so but only after imposing tough austerity 
programs pushing these countries into quick and deep spending cuts and intense recessions.   
Put differently, the creditor nations imposed their interests on the whole system. Their 
interest is that the loans they have extended recklessly to the South in the past should be 
repaid in full. Austerity is the mechanism to achieve this objective.   
                                                                
2 We define Northern Eurozone countries to be Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, and the 
Netherlands.  
3 The numbers in Figure 1 show the total cumulative current accounts. Ideally one would also like 
to know the intra-Eurozone current account positions and the net debt and creditor positions 
within the Euro area. We did not include these data as they are difficult to find in a consistent 
manner over a period of more than 20 years (as in Figure 1).  
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Source: European Commission, Ameco 
What is surprising is that the European Commission accepted to become the agent of the 
creditor nations in the Eurozone, pushing austerity as the instrument to safeguard the 
interest of these nations. The Commission could have decided otherwise and become the 
agent of the debtor nations protecting these from the insistence of reckless creditors to be 
repaid in full. This has been the response of many governments after the banking crisis. In 
many countries legislation has been introduced to protect consumers and house-owners 
from the banks’ insistence on full repayment. The view in many countries has been that, as 
the banks (the creditors) are equally responsible for the financial crises, they should face a 
significant part in the cost of adjustment, mainly by accepting losses on their loan portfolios.  
Another view could have prevailed and guided the conduct of macroeconomic policies in the 
Eurozone. This is the view that the responsibilities for the current account imbalances are 
shared between the creditor and debtor nations. The debtor nations took on too much debt 
and are responsible for that. The creditor nations extended too much credit and are thus 
equally responsible for the imbalances. For every foolish debtor there must be a foolish 
creditor. This symmetric view, however, has not prevailed in the relations between the 
creditor and debtor nations of the Eurozone. The former have been viewed as having 
followed virtuous policies and the latter as having followed foolish ones. As a result, the 
debtor nations have been forced to bear the full brunt of the adjustment.  
This has led to an asymmetric process where most of the adjustment has been done by the 
debtor nations. The latter countries have been forced to reduce wages and prices relative to 
the creditor countries (an “internal devaluation”) without compensating wage and price 
increases in the creditor countries (“internal revaluations”). This has been achieved by 
intense austerity programs in the South, while in the North no compensating stimulus was 
imposed.  
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In Figure 2, we show some evidence about the nature of this asymmetry. The figure 
shows the evolution of the relative unit labor costs4 of the debtor countries (where we 
use the average over the 1970-2010 period as the base period). Two features stand out. 
First, from 1999 until 2008/09, one observes the strong increase of these countries’ 
relative unit labor costs. Second, since 2008/09 quite dramatic turnarounds of the 
relative unit labor costs have occurred (internal devaluations) in Ireland, Spain and 
Greece, and to a lesser extent in Portugal and Italy. 
These internal devaluations have come at a great cost in terms of lost output and 
employment in the debtor countries. As these internal devaluations are not yet 
completed (except possibly in Ireland), more losses in output and employment are to be 
expected. 
Figure 2 
 
 Source: European Commission, Ameco 
Is there evidence that such a process of internal revaluations has been going on in the 
surplus countries? The answer is given in Figure 3 that presents the evolution of the 
relative unit labour costs in the creditor countries. One observes that since 2008/09 
there is very little movement in these relative unit labour costs in these countries.   
   
                                                                
4 The relative unit labour cost of a country is defined as the ratio of the unit labout costs of that 
country and the average unit labour costs in the rest of the Eurozone. An increase in this ratio 
indicates that the country in question has seen its unit labour costs increase faster than in the 
rest of the Eurozone, and vice versa.  
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  Figure 3 
 
 Source: European Commission, Ameco          
Thus, one can conclude that at the insistence of the creditor nations, the burden of the 
adjustments to the imbalances in the Eurozone has been borne almost exclusively by the 
debtor countries in the periphery.  This has created a deflationary bias that explains 
why the Eurozone has been pulled into a double-dip recession in 2011-12, and why it 
continues to be subject to deflationary forces. Another way to put this is as follows. 
Debtor countries were forced to do an internal devaluation that had as an effect to 
reduce wages and prices. This was not offset by internal revaluations in the creditor 
countries that would have raised wages and prices in these countries. As a result, of this 
asymmetric adjustment mechanism the Eurozone as a whole was subjected to a 
deflationary bias. This is made clear in Figure 4, 5 and 6.  
in Figure 4 where we compare the evolution of real GDP in the Eurozone with real GDP 
in the US and in the EU-countries not belonging to the Eurozone (EU10). The difference 
is striking. Prior to the financial crisis the Eurozone real GDP was on a slower growth 
path than in the US and in EU10. Since the financial crisis of 2008 the divergence has 
increased even further. Real GDP in the Eurozone stagnated and in 2014 was even lower 
than in 2008. In the US and EU-10 one observes (after the dip of 2009) a relatively 
strong recovery. Admittedly, this recovery is below the potential growth path of these 
countries (see Summers(2014)), but surely it has been much more pronounced than in 
the Eurozone where stagnation prevailed.  
Figure 5 shows the evolution of unemployment in the same group of countries. We 
observe the same phenomenon. A recovery in the US and EU-10 after 2010 shown by the 
decline in unemployment. This contrasts with the Eurozone where unemployment 
continued to increase so that in 2014 it was almost twice as high than in EU-10. 
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Finally Figure 6 shows the rates of inflation in the Eurozone and the US. We observe that 
the deflationary dynamics was more intense in the Eurozone than in the US. At the end 
of 2014 the rate of inflation in the Eurozone dropped below 0%. 
 
 
Source: European Commission, Ameco database 
 
Source: European Commission, Ameco database 
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Figure 4: Real GDP in Eurozone, EU10 and US  
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Figure 5: Unemployment rate in Eurozone, EU10 and US 
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Source: European Commission, Ameco database 
 
3. The legacy of creditor-dictated governance 
The creditor-dictated governance that has arisen since the eruption of the sovereign 
debt crisis in the Eurozone has led to a legacy that will take a long time to turn around. 
The most striking feature of this legacy is that despite intense austerity programs that 
have been triggered since 2010 there is no evidence that these programs have increased 
the capacity of the governments of the debtor countries to continue to service their debt. 
In Figure 4 we show the government debt ratios of the debtor countries. It can be seen 
that while the debt ratios started to increase in 2008 as a result of the banking crisis, the 
austerity programs that were set in motion after 2010 do not seem to have stopped the 
explosive growth of the debt ratios. (The possible exception is Ireland). In De Grauwe 
and Ji(2013) we provide evidence that the austerity programs in fact have been partly 
responsible for the further dramatic increase of the government debt ratios. The 
underlying mechanism is well known.  The recession that prevailed in the Southern 
countries was a “balance sheet recession” in which private agents desperately tried to 
reduce their debt levels. When at the insistence of the European Commission and the 
creditor nations, the Southern countries’ governments also were forced to deleverage, a 
debt deflation dynamics was set in motion leading to a deep recession. The latter had 
the effect of dramatically raising the government debt ratios, for two reasons. First the 
intensity of the recession had as an effect that government revenues declined leading to 
higher budget deficits. As a result, the debt (the numerator in the debt ratio) continued 
to increase. Second, the decline in GDP reduced the denominator of the debt ratio. The 
combined effect is that austerity led to an increase in the debt to GDP ratios.  
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Source: European Commission, AMECO database 
 
While the sovereign debt crisis and the austerity inspired policies have led to a legacy of 
unsustainable debt levels, the design failures of the Eurozone have not been addressed 
sufficiently. As a result, the prospect of future crises has not been diminished. What are 
these design failures? In De Grauwe (2011) these were analyzed in detail. Here we 
summarize them. 
4. Design failures of the Eurozone 
The design failures of the Eurozone find their origin in two factors. First the endogenous 
dynamics of booms and busts that are part of the capitalistic dynamics continued to 
work at the national level. The monetary union in no way disciplined these into a union-
wide dynamics. On the contrary the monetary union probably exacerbated these 
national booms and busts.  Second, the existing stabilizers that existed at the national 
level prior to the start of the union were stripped away from the member-states without 
being transposed at the monetary union level. This left the member states  “naked” and 
fragile, unable to deal with the coming national disturbances. Let us expand on these 
two points. 
4.1 Booms and busts dynamics 
In the Eurozone money and monetary policy are fully centralized. However, the rest of 
macroeconomic policies have remained firmly in the hands of national governments, 
producing idiosynchratic movements unconstrained by the existence of a common currency. 
As a result, there is very little in the monetary union that can make the booms and busts 
converge at the Eurozone level. The effect of all this is that booms and busts originate at the 
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national level and have a life of their own at the national level without becoming a common 
boom-and-bust dynamics at the Eurozone level. 
In fact it is even worse. The existence of the monetary union can exacerbate booms and 
busts at the national level. The reason is that the single interest rate that the ECB imposes 
on all the member countries is too low for the booming countries and too high for the 
countries in recession. Thus, when in Spain, Ireland, Greece the economy started to boom, 
inflation also picked up in these countries. As a result, the single nominal interest rate led to 
a low real interest rate in he booming countries, thereby aggravating the boom. The 
opposite occurred in the countries experiencing low growth or a recession.  
Thus, the fact that only one interest rate exists for the union exacerbates these differences, 
i.e. it leads to a stronger boom in the booming countries and a stronger recession in the 
recession countries than if there had been no monetary union.  
The effects of these divergent macroeconomic movements have by now been well 
documented. These led to divergences in inflation and relative unit labour costs and to 
current account imbalances. The booming Southern European countries (including Ireland) 
experienced systematically higher inflation rates and increases in unit labour costs than in 
the rest of the Eurozone. These booms led to large current account deficits in the South and 
surpluses in the North. As stressed earlier, the booms in the South allowed the Northern 
European countries to accumulate large current account surpluses. These were financed by 
credit that the Northern European countries granted to the South. It is important to 
recognize this because in the North of Europe the irresponsibility of Southern countries to 
take on too much debt is often stressed. The truth is that for every foolish debtor there must 
be a foolish creditor.  
4.2 No stabilizers left in place 
When the Eurozone was started a fundamental stabilizing force that existed at the level 
of the member-states was taken away from these countries. This is the lender of last 
resort function of the central bank. Suddenly, member countries of the monetary union 
had to issue debt in a currency they had no control over.  As a result, the governments of 
these countries could no longer guarantee that the cash would always be available to 
roll over the government debt. Prior to entry in the monetary union, these countries 
could, like all stand-alone countries, issue debt in their own currencies thereby giving an 
implicit guarantee that the cash would always be there to pay out bondholders at 
maturity. The reason is that as stand-alone countries they had the power to force the 
central bank to provide liquidity in times of crisis.  
What was not understood when the Eurozone was designed is that this lack of 
guarantee provided by Eurozone governments in turn could trigger self-fulfilling 
liquidity crises (a sudden stop) that would degenerate into solvency problems. This is 
exactly what happened in countries like Ireland, Spain and Portugal5. When investors 
                                                                
5 Greece does not fit this diagnosis. Greece was clearly insolvent way before the crisis started, but 
this was hidden to the outside world by a fraudulent policy of the Greek government of hiding the 
true nature of the Greek economic situation (see De Grauwe(2011)). 
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lost confidence in these countries, they massively sold the government bonds of these 
countries, pushing interest rates to unsustainably high levels. In addition, the euros 
obtained from these sales were invested in “safe countries” like Germany. As a result, 
there was a massive outflow of liquidity from the problem countries, making it 
impossible for the governments of these countries to fund the rollover of their debt at 
reasonable interest rate.  
This liquidity crisis in turn triggered another important phenomenon that we have 
documented in the previous section. It forced countries to switch-off the automatic 
stabilizers in the budget. The governments of the problem countries had to scramble for 
cash and were forced into instantaneous austerity programs, by cutting spending and 
raising taxes.  A deep recession was the result. The recession in turn reduced 
government revenues even further, forcing these countries to intensify the austerity 
programs. Under pressure from the financial markets and the creditor nations, fiscal 
policies became pro-cyclical pushing countries further into a deflationary cycle. As a 
result, what started as a liquidity crisis in a self-fulfilling way degenerated into a 
solvency crisis.  
Thus, we found out that financial markets acquire great power in a monetary union: 
they can force countries into a bad equilibrium characterized by increasing interest 
rates that trigger excessive austerity measures, which in turn lead to a deflationary 
spiral that aggravates the fiscal crisis, (see De Grauwe(2011) and De Grauwe and 
Ji(2013)).  
The Eurozone crisis that we now witness is the result of a combination of the two design 
failures identified here. On the one hand booms and busts continued to occur at the 
national level. In fact these were probably intensified by the very existence of a 
monetary union. On the other hand the stripping away of the lender of last resort 
support of the member state countries allowed liquidity crises to emerge when the 
booms turned into busts. These liquidity crises then forced countries to eliminate 
another stabilizing feature that had emerged after the Great Depression, i.e. the 
automatic stabilizers in the government budgets. As a result, some countries were 
forced into bad equilibria (Gros(2011)).  
What are the policy implications of these insights? We analyze three of them.  The first 
one relates to the role of the ECB; the second one to the need for a change in fiscal 
policies and the third one has to do with the long-run need to move into a fiscal union. 
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5. The ECB as a lender of last resort in the government bond markets 
The ECB is the only institution that can prevent market sentiments of fear and panic in 
the sovereign bond markets from pushing countries into a bad equilibrium. As money 
creating institution it has an infinite capacity to buy government bonds. The European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM) that became operational in October 2012 has limited 
resources and cannot credibly commit to such an outcome. The fact that resources are 
infinite is key to be able to stabilize bond rates. It is the only way to gain credibility in 
the market.  
On September 6, 2012 the ECB finally recognized this point and announced its “Outright 
Monetary Transactions” (OMT) program, which promises to buy unlimited amounts of 
sovereign bonds during crises. The ECB made the right decision to become a lender of 
last resort, not only for banks but also for sovereigns, thereby re-establishing a 
stabilizing force needed to protect the system from the booms and bust dynamics. In 
Figure 5 we show the evolution of the spreads before and after the OMT-announcement 
of 2012. It can be seen that since that announcement the spreads declined dramatically. 
By taking away the intense existential fears that the collapse of the Eurozone was 
imminent the ECB’s lender of last resort commitment pacified government bond 
markets and led to a strong decline in the spreads of the Eurozone countries.  
 
Source: Datasource 
However, the credibility of the program suffers because of continuing vehement 
criticism. This criticism reached its climax in early 2014 when the German 
Constitutional Court declared OMT illegal and referred the case to the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) with the demand that conditions be imposed on the OMT-program that 
would make it ineffective and useless. In May 2015 the ECJ ruled that OMT is legal. It is 
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likely that this will lead to a clash between two constitutional courts in the future. The 
risk is that this clash will undermine the credibility of the OMT program. 
The main argument made by the German judges is that the spreads reflect underlying 
economic fundamentals. Attempts by the ECB to reduce these spreads are attempts to 
counter the view of market participants. In doing so, the ECB is in fact pursuing 
economic policy, which is outside its mandate.  
Implicit in this argument is the view that markets are efficient (see De Grauwe(2014), 
and Winkler(2014)). The surging spreads observed from 2010 to the middle of 2012 
were the result of deteriorating fundamentals (e.g. domestic government debt, external 
debt, competitiveness, etc.). Thus, the market was just a messenger of bad news. Its 
judgment should then be respected, also by the ECB. The implication of the efficient 
market theory is that the only way these spreads can go down is by improving the 
fundamentals, mainly by austerity programs aimed at reducing government budget 
deficits and debts. With its OMT program the ECB is in fact reducing the need to improve 
these fundamentals.  
Another theory, while accepting that fundamentals matter, recognizes that collective 
movements of fear and panic can have dramatic effects on spreads. These movements 
can drive the spreads away from underlying fundamentals, very much like in the stock 
markets prices can be gripped by a bubble pushing them far away from underlying 
fundamentals.  The implication of that theory is that while fundamentals cannot be 
ignored, there is a special role for the central bank that has to provide liquidity in times 
of market panic. This is the view we have defended in the previous sections. It is 
supported by what happened in the government bond markets. The dramatic decline in 
the government bond rates of the debtor nations since the OMT-announcement 
occurred while at the same time the debt to GDP ratios continued to increase 
significantly (see De Grauwe and Ji(2014) for a more rigorous econometric test). 
The deflationary dynamics set in motion by the asymmetric adjustment mechanism 
analysed in section 2 led to a negative inflation at the end of 2014 (see figure 6). This 
forced the ECB that commits itself to keeping inflation close to 2% into action. In 
January 2015 it started a massive government bond-buying program, the so-called QE-
program. It was very much influenced by similar programs in the US and the UK that 
were activated five years earlier.  
There can be little doubt that the massive injection of liquidity by the ECB since early 
2015 had a positive effect on exports, mainly because It led to a depreciation of the euro 
vis-à-vis the major currencies (dollar, pound sterling) and boosted the competitiveness 
of eurozone exporters to the rest of the world.  
At the same time, however, it is becoming increasingly clear that QE alone is insufficient 
to pull the eurozone economies out of their lethargic growth. There is a fear that in the 
next few years economic growth will remain subdued, despite the past and future 
injections of liquidity (money base) in the system.  
None of this should come as a surprise. Economists have warned for a long time that 
when the economy is in a liquidity trap, i.e. interest rates are close to zero, quantitative 
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easing alone will not be able to stimulate the economy. The reason is that when the 
interest rates are close to zero, the liquidity that the central bank is creating is not easily 
filtered into the real economy. Most of it is hoarded because the opportunities to find 
attractive rates of return are limited. Many financial institutions then prefer to 
accumulate the extra liquidity created by the ECB without doing much productively with 
it. There is some part of that liquidity that finds its way into financial markets. This can 
then produce bubbles in some financial markets. There is, however, not much evidence 
that this has been empirically important in the Eurozone.   
Thus, while QE was and is necessary, it is insufficient. It has to be seconded by fiscal 
policies, which is where the real problem resides in the eurozone. Fiscal policies have 
not not been helpful. First, too many countries continued to be kept in the austerity 
straightjacket. Second, and most importantly, public investment continued to decline as 
a percent of GDP, also as a result of austerity programs. It is public investment that is 
key to the recovery in the eurozone. Unfortunately, public investment is discouraged by 
a rule that the members of the eurozone have imposed on themselves, i.e. that public 
investment cannot be financed by bond issue. It has to be financed by current tax 
revenues. This constraint prevents public investment from taking off and from 
sustaining the recovery. 
6. Completing the monetary union with political union 
In this section I will argue that the institutional setup that has been created in the 
Eurozone is not sustainable and will have to be completed with steps towards a fiscal 
union. The latter implies a degree of political union that goes much farther than what 
has been achieved so far. Let us develop these points further. 
The present institutional setup of the Eurozone is characterized by the fact that a 
number of bureaucratic institutions have acquired significant responsibilities without 
political accountability. Thus there has been a transfer of sovereignty without a 
concomitant democratic legitimacy. 
6.1 The ECB and political union 
The European Central Bank’s power has increased significantly as a result of the 
sovereign debt crisis. With the announcement of the OMT program and given the 
success of this program it has become clear (at least outside Germany) that the ECB is 
the ultimate guarantor of the sovereign debt in the Eurozone. In this sense the ECB has 
become a central bank like the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England. There is one 
important difference though. In the US and the UK there is a primacy of the government 
over the central bank, i.e. in times of crisis it is the government that will force the central 
bank to provide liquidity. When the sovereign in these countries is threatened it will 
prevail over the central bank. This is not the case in the Eurozone. In the latter, the 
governments depend on the goodwill of the ECB to provide liquidity. They have no 
power over the ECB and cannot force that institution, even in times of crisis, to provide 
liquidity. Thus, in the Eurozone today there is a primacy of the central bank over the 
sovereigns.  
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This is a model that cannot be sustained in democratic societies. The ECB consists of 
unelected officials, while governments are populated by elected officials. It is 
inconceivable that these governments (especially if they are large) will accept to be 
pushed into insolvency while unelected officials in Frankfurt have the power to prevent 
this but refuse to use this power. When tested such a model of the governance of the 
Eurozone will collapse and rightly so.  
Thus we arrive at the following conundrum. The role of the ECB as a lender of last resort 
is essential to keep the Eurozone afloat. Yet at the same time the present governance of 
this crucial lender of last resort function is unsustainable because its use depends on the 
goodwill of the ECB, thereby making democratically legitimate governments’ fate 
depend on the judgment of unelected officials. In order to sustain this role of the central 
bank as a lender of last resort it has to be made subordinate to the political power of 
elected officials, as it is in modern democracies such as the US, Sweden, the UK, etc. This 
can only be achieved by creating a Eurozone government that is backed by a European 
parliament and that has primacy over the central bank. 
6.2 The European Commission and political union 
We face a similar problem with the European Commission. The latter has seen its 
responsibilities increase. This has been motivated by the desire of the creditor nations 
to impose budgetary and macroeconomic discipline on the debtor nations. As a result, 
the Stability and Growth Pact has been strengthened, and the European Commission has 
been entrusted with the responsibility of monitoring macroeconomic imbalances and to 
force debtor nations to change their macroeconomic policies6.  
The idea that macroeconomic imbalances should be monitored and controlled is a good 
one. As we have argued the emergence of such imbalances is at the heart of the 
emergence of the euro-crisis. Yet the way this idea has been implemented is 
unsustainable in the long run. The new responsibilities of the European Commission 
create a similar problem of democratic legitimacy as the one observed with the ECB. The 
European Commission can now force countries to raise taxes and reduce spending 
without, however, having to bear the political cost of these decisions. These costs are 
borne by national governments. This is a model that cannot work. Governments that 
face the political costs of spending and taxation will not continue to accept the decisions 
of unelected officials who do not face the cost of the decisions they try to impose on 
these governments. Sooner or later governments will go on strike, like the German and 
French governments did in 2003-04. Only the small countries (Portugal, Belgium, 
Ireland, etc.) will have to live with this governance. Large countries will not. 
6.3 Bureaucratic versus political integration 
Increasingly, European integration has taken the form of bureaucratic integration as a 
substitute for political integration.  This process has started as soon as the European 
political elite became aware that further political integration would be very difficult. 
                                                                
6 In principle the macroeconomic imbalance procedure should work symmetrically. It is, 
however, very unlikely to work that way. In fact we see already todya that the European 
Commission exerts more pressure on deficit countries than on surplus countries that are handled 
with a lot of care.  
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This process has become even stronger since the start of the sovereign debt crisis in the 
Eurozone. The outcome of this crisis has been that the European Commission and the 
European Central Bank have seen their powers increase significantly, without any 
increase in their accountability. More and more these two institutions impose decisions 
that affect millions of people’s welfare, but the people who are affected by these 
decisions do not have the democratic means to express their disagreements.  
Political scientists make a distinction between output and input legitimacy. Output 
legitimacy means that a particular decision is seen to be legitimate if it leads to an 
increase in general welfare. In this view a government that is technocratic can still be 
legitimate if it is perceived to improve welfare. This view is very much influenced by the 
Platonic view of the perfect State. This is a State that is run by benevolent philosophers 
who know better than the population what is good for them and act to increase the 
country’s welfare.  
Input legitimacy means that political decisions, whatever their outcome, must be based 
on a process that involves the population, through elections that allow people to sack 
those who have made bad decisions.   
Much of the integration process in Europe has been based on the idea of output 
legitimacy. The weak part of that kind of legitimacy becomes visible when the 
population is not convinced that what the philosophers at the top have decided, has 
improved welfare. That is the situation today in Europe. In many countries there is a 
perception that the decisions taken in Brussels and Frankfurt have harmed their 
welfare. 
6.4 Towards a fiscal union? 
The only governance that can be sustained in the Eurozone is one where a Eurozone 
government backed by a European parliament acquires the power to tax and to spend. 
This will then also be a government that will prevail over the central bank in times of 
crisis and not the other way around. Put differently, the Eurozone can only be sustained 
if it is embedded in a fiscal and political union.  
A fiscal union involves two dimensions. First, it involves a (partial) consolidation of 
national government debts. Such a consolidation creates a common fiscal authority that 
can issue debt in a currency under the control of that authority. This protects the 
member states from being forced into default by financial markets.  It also protects the 
monetary union from the centrifugal forces that financial markets can exert on the 
union. Finally, by creating a common fiscal authority (a government) we can create a 
governance structure in which the (European) sovereign prevails over the central bank 
rather than the other way around.  
Second, by (partially) centralizing national government budgets into one central budget 
a mechanism of automatic transfers can be organized. Such a mechanism works as an 
insurance transferring resources to the country hit by a negative economic shock. 
Although there are limits to such an insurance that arise from moral hazard risk, it 
remains true that such a mechanism is essential for the survival of a monetary union, 
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like it is for the survival of a nation state. Without a minimum of solidarity (that’s what 
insurance is) no union can survive.  
While all this is well known, it is equally clear that the willingness today to move in the 
direction of a fiscal union in Europe today is non-existent. This fact will continue to 
make the Eurozone a fragile institution, the future of which remains in doubt. The euro 
crisis is not over.  
The unwillingness to create a political union has also led to a continuing temptation to 
resort to technical solutions to the problem. Thus there has been a proliferation of 
technical schemes to introduce Eurobonds (see Delpla and von Weizsäcker(2010), De 
Grauwe and Moesen(2009) and insurance mechanisms against asymmetric shocks (Von 
Hagen and Diamond((1998), Drèze(2012), Enderlein, et al.(2013)). These are 
interesting intellectual exercises to which one of the present authors has also 
contributed. They do not solve the essential problem, however, which is that there is no 
future for the euro except in a political union. In fact they generate a fiction that 
technical solutions (and therefore also bureaucratic integration) can be a substitute for 
political unification. As a result, they comfort policymakers in their decision to set aside 
all further attempts towards a political union. 
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Highlights 
 
 The Eurozone crisis has left a legacy of unsustainable government 
debt levels.  
 The design failures of the Eurozone have not yet been resolved.  
 The little integration that has occurred has been bureaucratic, not 
political. 
